May 21, 2012

Empire and Nation in England and Arabia:
A Review of The Balfour Declaration, The Origins of the Arab-Israeli Conflict by Jonathan Schneer

by Daniel E. Levenson, ALM

November 4, 2010

 

The first thing that readers of Professor Jonathan Schneer’s new book The Balfour Declaration, The Origins of The Arab-Israeli Conflict, will notice is the thorough approach that the author takes in exploring the multi-layered landscape of the Middle East, as well as the motivations of the British empire in the opening decades of the twentieth century and the roots of Arab nationalism. Professor Schneer seems to be keenly aware of the importance of providing such context and background, and it will serve readers of this book quite well. The second thing that readers may notice, however, is that for a book which has as its title the name of a key document in the history of Zionism that Professor Schneer devotes the majority of his book to exploring the intersection of British imperialism, World War I and the rise of Arab nationalism. As such, this book will be of interest to those seeking a broader understanding of the political situation in Whitehall and Mecca as it touched on early nineteenth century Zionism, but those in search of a book focused on the relationship between the British Empire and Zionism will be disappointed.

 

In his exploration of Arabian politics and ideology, Professor Schneer carefully outlines how the movement for the creation of an independent Arab state (or perhaps, more accurately, empire) in the Middle East, was led primarily by one Hussein Ibn Ali, the sharif of Mecca, who sought to extend the range and scope of his influence beyond Mecca and the area which is present-day Saudi Arabia. For the British, however, the sharif and the rise of Arab nationalism were elements which they thought could be useful in efforts to maintain their grip on the Suez Canal and help protect other regional interests. The Sharif and his sons were themselves eager to create an alliance with the British and lead a rebellion which would allow them to break away from the influence and control of the Ottoman Empire. They were lead to believe that this move would then lead to the establishment of an independent Arab nation which they would rule, but it is clear, from what Professor Schneer writes, that the British had a much less altruistic larger goal in mind.

 

While it is unclear whether or not Hussein Ibn Ali was aware of a certain level of British duplicity, he went ahead with his plans to raise an Arab army anyway, and sent his sons out on missions to raise support for the rebellion among other Arab leaders. Professor Schneer notes that for the British, the Arab revolt had the potential to deliver significant rewards regardless of its success, writing “Merely by taking place, regardless of its success or failure, the Arab Revolt would divert the Turks; it would blunt their call for jihad; it would convert many Arabs to the allied cause.” (Schneer, 97) As such, British officials had few qualms about engaging in a certain level of disambiguation when it came to defining a number of key terms in the agreements they tried to make with Arab leaders.

 

It appears that this lack of clarity is at least partly to blame for many of the calamitous outcomes that were to follow British attempts to ally themselves with Arab nationalists and this issue will be worth noting for those interested in the present Arab-Israeli conflict, for the legacy of such miscommunications and misunderstandings are still with us today, and continue to cast a long shadow on the political landscape of the Middle East.  Professor Schneer notes, for example, the problems which the use of the word “Arabia,” caused in one early and important exchange between the sharif and the British, writing “The indeterminate term was crucial: By ‘Arabia’ did he mean not merely the Hejaz but the entire Arabian Peninsula? Did he even perhaps mean Mesopotamia and Syria too, including Palestine? He did not specify.” (Schneer, 37)

The author’s description of maneuvering by a wide range of powers, from the shariff of Mecca to the governments of Britain, France and Russia, (all of which were interested in dividing up Turkish real estate of the Middle East after a presumed victory over the Ottoman Empire), demonstrates not only the sweeping nature of European hegemonic aspiration during this period, but the extremely complicated roots of the diplomatic and military questions which were to arise in the wake of the war. Perhaps one of the most striking examples of this audacity is in Professor Schneer’s description of the manner in which two men, Sir Mark Sykes representing Britain, and Francois George-Picot of France, were duly authorized by both nations to devise a mutually beneficial  actual plan to divide up the Middle East between their respective nations (and Russia) after a presumed Ottoman defeat. Schneer writes that, “Together Sykes and Picot redrew the Middle Eastern map. We may picture them in a grand conference room at the Foreign Office, crayons in hand. They colored blue the portions on the map that they agreed to allocate to France, and they colored the portions they would allocate to Britain.” (Schneer, 79)

 

Although this plan was never put into action, thanks in part to shifting political attitudes in Russia and America, the Sykes-Picot agreement still offers an important window into the worldview of many of the key players involved. Furthermore, both Sykes and Picot would continue to play a role in helping to craft what Professor Schneer refers to at one point in his book as the “post-Ottoman Middle East.”

 

The author’s description of the ways in which both Sykes and Picot first came into contact with Zionist leaders and ideas is noteworthy in this respect, especially given that the first prominent Jewish leader with whom they met was Moses Gaster, a figure whom Professor Schneer describes as “…jealous, self-important, quick to take offense, and sometimes neither clear-sighted nor clear-minded. He told Sykes that he could speak for and control the Zionist movement in Britain, but that was not true. Although he had enthused about the Franco-British condominium in his diary he, he strongly opposed it to Sykes in person …” (Schneer, 170)

Fortunately, they did not let a relative lack of success in their meeting with Gaster dissuade them from seeking out other Jewish leaders who could speak with greater authority and authenticity about the Zionist cause, including the famed agronomist, Zionist and British spy, Aaron Aaronsohn, and eventually Chaim Weizmann himself.

Unfortunately, Zionism and the role of leading Zionist figures, in Britain and elsewhere, is not addressed until roughly a third of the way into the book after the reader has already become well-acquainted with most of the pertinent Arab and British figures. This is unfortunate because when Professor Schneer does turn his attention to this topic his writing is no less lucid or erudite than when he describes political maneuvering among the Arabs or British, and so there is little doubt that had he chosen to do so, he could have given the reader a much richer portrait of British Zionism. Furthermore, given that the Balfour declaration came about largely as a result of the work of Zionists, one would think that figures such as Theodore Hertzl ( by way of background) and Chaim Weizmann (as the leading figure of British Zionism) would have had a stronger presence earlier on in the text. It is clear that Weizmann in particular was not only a powerful force within the British Jewish community but had considerable influence as well when it came to the British government. The author notes of Weizmann’s intervention during a deadlock in discussions on the official British position on whether or not to support the creation of a Jewish state in the Middle East, that “…he hurled himself into a last great effort to push the declaration through. He mobilized American Zionists to extract a pledge from Wilson, and urged British Zionists to press forward one more time. At his indirect instigation, hundreds of telegrams, from Jewish congregations across the length and breadth of the British Isles, all urging government support for the declaration, flooded into the Foreign Office. By the fall of 1917 Weizmann could turn the key to most doors in Whitehall.” (Schneer, 339)

 

It is interesting to note, though, that British Jewry was hardly unified in their support for the creation of a Jewish state. Major divisions existed between those whom Schneer puts into the category of “Zionists” among British Jews and those whom he refers to as “Assimilationists.” Although the latter were ostensibly opposed to the idea of pushing for an independent Jewish state in Palestine, Schneer notes that they too began to feel ill-at-ease with some of the ways that the march toward war impacted British society. He writes of the Assimilationists, that, although “Enjoying full legal and civic equality, they understood themselves to be the beneficiaries of many decades of turmoil and tears and hard political organizing. Now a mood created by the war seemed to call their hard-earned gains into question. The war stoked nationalist passions, giving scope to xenophobes and anti-Semites who usually inhabited the fringes and dark corners of national life.” (Schneer, 138). Tensions between these two competing groups of British Jews is a topic which Professor Schneer explores in greater detail in the last section of his book, which comes off as a bit jarring, given that the previous 300 pages have been largely focused on Arab nationalism, British imperialism and the crumbling Ottoman Empire.

 

Even within the Zionist camp itself there were divisions and points of contention with which Weizmann, as the leading figure of the movement, was forced to contend. Professor Schneer identifies several major issues which were potentially divisive within the British Zionist community as the pursuit of a separate peace with Turkey by the British, including unwillingness on the part of  the British Palestine Committee of Manchester to take direction from the British Foreign Office, and the proposed  creation of a Jewish regiment in the British army which would be sent to Palestine to fight.

 

The last issue proved unworkable for a variety of reasons, not least of which that there were already many Jews serving throughout the regular British armed forces and it would have been impractical to reassign them to a new, all-Jewish element, of the British Army. But Professor Schneer does not explore this in very great detail, and the focus of the book soon shifts back to issues of British territorial aspirations in the Mid-East and Arab nationalism, describing the adventures of T.E. Lawrence as he struggled with a sense of dual loyalty to both the Arabs with whom he served and the grand designs of the British government to expand their influence in the Middle East after the war ended. In his description of the crucial relationships which existed between British Jewry, Zionist leaders and the British government, Professor Schneer is careful to set the various discussions, quarrels and intrigues which arose, against the backdrop of the first World War, and specifically in relation to the development of British war strategy vis-à-vis the Ottoman Empire. Whatever other motivations might have existed for Britain to form alliances with both Arab and Jewish leaders, concern over the role of the Turks in the Middle East was a, if not the, primary motivator for such diplomatic efforts. One odd element which the author explores in this regard is the way in which perceptions of Jewish “power” and by extension the ways in which Jews living throughout the world might influence the outcome of the war, helped to shape British thinking on the question of supporting the creation of a Jewish state. Professor Schneer claims that even Jews were willing to make such allusions when they felt it necessary, and he adds that this (mis)perception was ultimately responsible for removing final obstacles when it came to achieving the Balfour Declaration.

 

But even at this late hour the success of the Declaration was not a foregone conclusion, in fact, one of the more remarkable series of events which Professor Schneer explores is comprised of efforts by some British leaders to keep the possibility of a separate peace with the Ottomans (which would have prevented, effectively, the creation of an either an Arab or Jewish state on Ottoman land) open, even as conflicting promises of aid in establishing independent states was being made to both the Zionists and Arab nationalists. Professor Schneer notes that, “…in July of 1917 Weizmann and his colleagues had judged any discussion of peace with Turkey out of bounds. Had they known that Loyd George proposed to accept any form of Ottoman Suzerainty in Palestine, they would have deemed it a gross betrayal. So would have the Arabs.” (Schneer, 358)

Those who are looking to add some depth to their bookshelves when it comes to the broader context of early twentieth century Zionism, specifically as it relates to Arab nationalism (which Professor Schneer indicates existed on a largely parallel track until eventually the two ideologies collided) and British imperialism, will find this book useful, but for casual readers with an interest in Zionist history Professor Schneer’s book may not fit the bill.

 

Reviewed in this piece: The Balfour Declaration, The Origins of the Arab-Israeli Conflict by Jonathan Schneer. New York: Random House, 2010.

Copyright Daniel E. Levenson 2010